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The	role	of	mercy	in	India
Shubhangi	Agarwalla	argues	that	the	death	penalty	has	bureaucratised	death	and	in	doing	so,
relieved	individuals	of	a	sense	of	their	own	moral	responsibility	within	its	delivery.	Considering	Derrida’s
seminal	argument	on	mercy,	Indian	society	must	reconsider	the	pivotal	role	of	mercy	within	justice,
writes	Agarwalla.
In	India	there	has	recently	been	such	a	sustained	focus	on	the	right	to	impose	the	death	penalty	that
sometimes	eclipses	its	essential	corollary,	namely	the	sovereign	right	to	spare	life.	In	India’s	modern	political	system,
this	power	to	spare	life	remains	in	the	form	of	executive	clemency.	Executive	clemency,	enumerated	in	Article	72	of
the	Indian	Constitution,	represents	an	escape	valve	where	officials	unaffiliated	with	the	judiciary	can	survey	the
landscape	and	make	decisions	on	factors	beyond	the	law.	Thus,	the	most	logical	use	of	clemency	powers	is	when	an
individual	wrongly	convicted,	can	demonstrate	that	the	system	failed	or,	that	they	are	innocent.
Critics,	however,	have	argued	that	this	conflicts	with	the	demands	of	justice	and	equality	–	demands	a	liberal	state
presumably	must	heed.	Due	to	mercy’s	arbitrary	and	capricious	nature,	the	state,	they	argue,	should	be	lawful,	not
merciful.	A	study	of	the	mercy	petitions	rejected	by	various	Presidents	in	recent	history	lends	some	merit	to	their
argument	since	it	reveals	a	trend	of	politicisation	of	mercy.
Examining	the	cases
For	example,	the	rejection	of	Saibanna	Ningappa	Natikar’s	mercy	petition	came	right	after	the	December	16th	gang
rape	of	Nirbhaya;	a	time	when	the	government	needed	a	facile	gesture	to	show	that	it	was	tough	on	crime	against
women.	He	had	been	sentenced	to	death	for	murdering	his	second	wife	and	daughter	after	having	been	convicted	for
murdering	his	first	wife,	however	his	case	was	riddled	with	glaring	judicial	blunders	from	start	to	end.	Both	the	trial
court	and	the	High	Court	convicted	and	sentenced	Saibanna	under	s.	303	of	the	Indian	Penal	Code	which	provided
for	mandatory	death	sentence	but	had	been	struck	down	as	unconstitutional	some	twenty	years	earlier.	The
Supreme	Court	took	full	notice	of	the	s.	303	issue	but	then	noted	that	the	session’s	court	faulty	finding	did	not
prejudice	the	cause	of	the	accused	since	there	was	no	record	of	any	mitigating	circumstances.	However	what	the
Court	failed	to	consider	was	that	in	cases	under	s.	303	there	is	no	sentencing	hearing,	and	hence	no	opportunity	to
bring	on	record	mitigating	circumstances.	Moreover,	the	Court	squarely	based	its	death	sentence	verdict	on	the
erroneous	view	that	Saibanna,	already	undergoing	a	life	sentence,	could	not	be	sentenced	to	life	imprisonment
again,	and	therefore	the	death	sentence	was	the	only	available	punishment.
Thus	in	effect,	the	Supreme	Court	revived	mandatory	death	sentencing.	So	glaring	were	these	errors	that	a
campaign	had	been	launched	pursuant	to	which	fourteen	eminent	retired	judges	of	the	High	Court	and	the	Supreme
Court	wrote	to	the	President	asking	him	to	commute	these	death	sentences.	They	said	that	it	would	be
unconscionable	and	a	blot	on	the	administration	of	justice	to	execute	Saibanna	whose	petition	had	been	pending	for
25	years.	These	factors	should	have	necessitated	the	commutation	of	the	death	sentence	by	a	government	with
even	an	iota	of	respect	for	the	rule	of	law.
Similarly,	Kashmiri	separatist	Afzal	Guru,	had	been	convicted	on	scanty	evidence.	It	is	widely	acknowledged	that
President	Pranab	Mukherjee’s	rejection	of	Afzal	Guru’s	mercy	petition	after	seven-and-a-half	years	was	in	response
to	the	pressure	put	on	him	by	local	politicians	return	for	political	support	during	his	election	campaign.	In	the
aftermath	of	Afzal	Guru’s	execution,	Omar	Abdulla	made	a	statement	that	the	government	must	show	that	it	was	not
selectively	and	unfairly	targeting	Muslims.	Shortly	after,	and	perhaps	responding	to	this	statement,	Mukherjee
promptly	rejected	the	mercy	petitions	of	Veerappan’s	alleged	Hindu	and	Christian	associates	who	were	also
convicted	under	anti-terrorist	legislation.
However,	I	argue	that	until	the	death	penalty	is	abolished,	we	need	mercy	even	if	that	means	reimagining	its
landscape.	We	need	mercy	because:	1)	as	demonstrated	in	the	cases	above,	the	arbitrary,	inconsistent	and
erroneous	use	of	the	death	penalty	necessitates	an	additional	filter	to	correct	miscarriages	of	justice;	2)	it	takes	into
account	non-legal	factors;	and	3)	it	humanises	the	increasing	bureaucratization	of	our	lives.
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An	examination	of	the	aforementioned	cases	not	only	reveals	politicisation	of	mercy	by	the	Presidents	but	also	a
Shylockian	belief	of	the	public	that	extracting	retribution	to	the	fullest	permissible	extent	will	secure	closure.	But
turning	to	Shakespeare	once	more,	as	Portia	was	quick	to	point	out,	there	might	be	merit	in	not	demanding	our	full
pound	of	flesh.	Mercy	bends	the	arc	of	the	moral	universe	to	a	more	emphatic	view	of	justice,	not	merely	a	retributive
one.	Formal	justice	is	not	equipped	to	calculate	the	punishment	a	person	morally	or	justly	deserves,	because	that
would	require	an	examination	of	the	choices	available	to	the	offender,	their	character	and	the	true	nature	of	the	harm
they	have	caused.	Formal	justice	does	not	necessitate	an	evaluation	of	the	social,	political,	psychological	and
economic	contexts	underpinning	the	offence	and	the	offender,	and	nor	is	it	able	to	particularise	the	appropriate
response	in	each	case.	Mercy	enables	consideration	of	matters	not	admitted	in	court,	thereby	facilitating	a	discussion
of	not	merely	reasons	for	the	verdict	but	also	equities	of	the	punishment	imposed.
Ajmal	Kasab’s	execution	is	a	very	interesting	case	to	revisit	in	this	regard.	Kasab	had	of	course	committed	an
unpardonable	crime,	and,	due	to	damning	photographs	and	videographic	evidence	his	guilt	was	not	questioned.	The
Indian	public	was	profoundly	hurt	and	grieving.	While	his	conviction	was	inevitable,	the	rejection	of	his	mercy	petition
should	not	have	been.	The	platitude	that	we	are	all	products	of	our	circumstances	has	much	to	offer	here.	This	is	not
to	suggest	an	absolute	lack	of	human	agency	in	things	we	do	but	to	argue	that	the	things	we	do	are	influenced	by
much	more	than	just	individual	will.	Our	demands	for	justice	should	be	tempered	by	this	reality.	In	this	context,	having
been	sold	to	a	terrorist	organisation	for	a	paltry	sum	when	he	was	13	years	old,	leading	to	a	lifetime	of	abuse	and
brainwashing	should	Kasab	not	have	been	a	candidate	for	mercy?		Does	this	case	not	lie	outside	the	realm	of
‘normal’	or	‘ordinary’	cases	for	which	the	system	for	formal	justice	is	aptly	designed?
Pardoning	the	unpardonable?
Revisiting	Derrida’s	seminal	work	on	forgiveness	is	illuminative	in	this	regard.	Exploring	diverse	manifestations	of	the
pardon	from	the	Japanese	apology,	the	language	of	forgiveness	in	the	South	African	Truth	Commission,	and	the	role
of	pardon	in	the	mitigation	of	punishment,	Derrida	located	a	paradox	about	pardon	–	“it	is	necessary	it	seems	to	me,
based	on	the	fact	that,	yes,	there	is	the	unpardonable.	Is	this	not	in	truth	the	only	thing	to	pardon?	The	only	thing
which	calls	for	the	pardon?”	(2001:46).	In	other	words,	it	is	only	pardoning	the	unpardonable,	exercising	compassion
without	a	ground,	which	gives	pardon	its	true	meaning.
Bereft	of	mercy,	our	society	becomes	impoverished	and	inhuman.	The	demise	of	mercy	reflects	the	increasing
depersonalisation	and	bureaucratisation	of	our	culture.	Ralph	Hummel,	in	his	critique	of	the	bureaucratic	society,
notes	that	“bureaucrats	are	asked	to	take	their	guiding	values	from	a	reservoir	of	norms	designed	by	the	bureaucratic
system.	When	these	come	into	conflict	with	personal	norms,	the	personal	norms	must	be	sacrificed”	(2008:56)
Without	mercy,	the	death	penalty	truly	becomes	a	bureaucracy	of	death,	with	internally	imposed	norms	and	without
personal	reflection.	This	bureaucratisation	affords	everyone	involved	in	imposing	the	death	penalty	the	illusion	that
no	one	has	decided	that	any	given	individual	should	die;	it	relieves	them	of	responsibility.
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Thus,	the	real	import	of	my	proposal	lies	in	the	Presidents’	assumption	of	responsibility	to	wrestle	personally	with	the
moral	problems	posed	by	the	death	penalty	for	the	achievement	of	justice	in	the	widest	sense	of	the	term.	Most
importantly,	for	mercy	to	survive	in	India,	the	Indian	public	may	have	to	realise	that	mercy,	sentiment,	empathy,	and
emotion	are	worthy	mirrors	of	their	better	selves.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.
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